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THE OTHER TRAGEDY OF VEHICULAR
RELATED DEATHS IN OHIO'S CRIMINAL
STATUTES
I.

INTRODUCTION

Ohio's vehicular homicide related statutes' and involuntary manslaughter statute, overlap substantially. The homicide statutes consist
of aggravated vehicular homicide and vehicular homicide. Aggravated
vehicular homicide is a felony arising from the reckless operation of a
motor vehicle.3 Vehicular homicide is a misdemeanor arising from the
negligent operation of a motor vehicle.4 Causing the death of another
while committing either a felony or a misdemeanor gives rise to involuntary manslaughter.5 The involuntary manslaughter statute does not
exclude vehicular related deaths from its coverage. Consequently, the

driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in another's death
can be charged with all three offenses, acquitted of the vehicular re6
lated homicides and yet, stand convicted of involuntary manslaughter.

This overlap has resulted in the application of involuntary manslaughter rather than the vehicular homicide statutes, even though the
resulting death was proximately caused by the operation of a motor
vehicle." As a result, both the aggravated vehicular homicide and vehicular homicide statutes become nugatory statutes. The Ohio legislature,

in enacting the vehicular related homicide statutes, provided a means
of responding to the tragic loss of lives resulting from automobile acci-

1. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.06 (Baldwin Supp. 1990) (aggravated vehicular homicide); id. § 2903.07 (vehicular homicide).
2. Id. § 2903.04 (Baldwin 1986).
3. Id. § 2903.06 (Baldwin Supp. 1990).
4. Id. § 2903.07.
5. Id. § 2903.04 (Baldwin 1986). The statute provides:
(A) No person shall cause the death of another as a proximate result of the offender's
committing or attempting to commit a felony.
(B) No person shall cause the death of another as a proximate result of the offender's
committing or attempting to commit a misdemeanor.
Id.
6. State v. Lacy, No. H-86-2 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 21, 1986) (LEXIS, Ohio library, App
file); State v. Centers, No. 9380 (Ohio Ct. App. May 19, 1986) (LEXIS, Ohio library, App file);
State v. White, No. 85-958 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 13, 1986); State v. Davis, 13 Ohio App. 3d 265,
469 N.E.2d 83 (1983).
7. E.g., State v. Chippendale, 52 Ohio St. 3d 118, 556 N.E.2d 1134 (1990); State v. Centers, No. 9380 (Ohio Ct. App. May 19, 1986) (LEXIS, Ohio library, App file); State v. Davis, 13
Ohio App. 3d 265, 469 N.E.2d 83 (1983).
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dents.8 These statutes were expressly designed to punish those who
recklessly or negligently operate a motor vehicle and cause another's
death.9 If a jury acquits the accused of either of those offenses, punishment is not warranted. Thus, by displacing these statutes with a conviction of involuntary manslaughter for the same conduct, the courts are
not acting consistently with that purpose. The legislature essentially
carved out from the involuntary manslaughter statute specific offenses
and corresponding penalties for deaths caused by the operation of a
motor vehicle. Although the breadth of the involuntary manslaughter
statute can include vehicular related deaths, 10 it should not be applied
in that manner as either the main offense or a lesser included offense to
aggravated vehicular homicide or vehicular homicide.
The other tragedy of vehicular related deaths under Ohio's criminal statutes occurs when there is a conviction and penalties are imposed
for involuntary manslaughter where reckless or negligent conduct cannot be established to prove a violation of either section 2903.06 or
2903.07. The involuntary manslaughter penalties are harsher than the
corresponding penalties for aggravated vehicular homicide and vehicular homicide." Therefore, those convicted of involuntary manslaughter,

8. In 1970 there were 2,488 deaths as a result of motor vehicles accidents and 2,336 in
1972. UNITED STATES DEPT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 600
(1976) (chart 1004).
9. §§ 2903.06-.07 (Baldwin Supp. 1990); see also OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM'N, PROPOSED
OHIO CRIMINAL CODE 76, 77 (1971). This proposed code was the final report of the Technical
Committee to Study Ohio Criminal Laws and Procedures [hereinafter The Technical Committee)
and was made available to the public at the time of issuance. The Technical Committee was
appointed by the Legislative Service Commission.
10. The death of another proximately caused by a person committing a misdemeanor traffic
offense can give rise to involuntary manslaughter. § 2903.04 (Baldiin. 1986).
11. Involuntary manslaughter based on a felony, a violation of section 2903.04(A), is an
aggravated felony of the first degree. Id. § 2903.04(C). An aggravated felony of the first degree is
punishable by a mandatory minimum of five years imprisonment with a maximum term of twentyfive years. Id. § 2929.11 (B)(1)(a). Involuntary manslaughter based on a misdemeanor, a violation
of section 2903.04(B), is an aggravatedfelony of the third degree. Id. § 2903.04(C). An aggravated felony of the third degree is punishable by a minimum of two years and a maximum of ten
years imprisonment. Id. § 2929.11(B)(3)(a).
Aggravated vehicular homicide is a felony of the third degree. Id. § 2903.06(B) (Baldwin
Supp. 1990). From 1974 until 1989, when section 2903.06(B) was amended, aggravated vehicular
homicide was a felony of the fourth degree carrying a maximum penalty of five years. Id. §§
2903.06(B), 2929.11(B)(7) (Baldwin 1986).
Vehicular homicide is a misdemeanor of the first degree. Id. § 2903.07(B) (Baldwin Supp.
1990). Imprisonment for a misdemeanor of the first degree cannot exceed six months. id. §
2929.21(B)(1) (Baldwin 1986).
Thus, if the underlying conduct resulting in the vehicular related death was reckless (aggravated vehicular homicide), the range of imprisonment is two to ten years, and if the underlying
conduct was negligent (vehicular homicide), imprisonment could not exceed six months. However,
if the underlying conduct was neither reckless nor negligent, but a misdemeanor was committed,
an individual could still be imprisoned up to ten years for a conviction of involuntary
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and not aggravated or vehicular homicide, for a vehicular related death
are serving prison terms inconsistent with the penalties that Ohio's
elected representatives deemed appropriate for the underlying conduct.
This article proposes that the offense of involuntary manslaughter
should not apply to vehicular related deaths for four reasons. First, if
the involuntary manslaughter statute is used in conjunction with vehicular related deaths it renders the aggravated vehicular homicide and
vehicular homicide statutes useless. 2 Second, imposing a prison term
under the involuntary manslaughter statute on an individual who
caused a fatal car accident distorts the criminal penalty structure." s
Third, sentencing individuals who have been acquitted of aggravated
vehicular homicide (recklessness) or vehicular homicide (negligence)
under the involuntary manslaughter statute serves none of the underlying purposes for punishment in our criminal system. 4 Finally, the use
of the involuntary manslaughter statute for vehicular related deaths
prosecutorial discretion because of the statute's perprovides unlimited
5
1

vasive scope.
This article identifies three possible options available to the Ohio
General Assembly to rectify the problems caused by the overlap of sections 2903.04 and 2903.06-.07. The first legislative option is to limit
involuntary manslaughter charges to deaths caused by conduct other
than the operation of a motor vehicle. A second option is to repeal the
vehicular related homicide statutes and the involuntary manslaughter
statute and replace them with a manslaughter statute based on differing culpable mental states. The last option is to restructure the penalties associated with the three existing statutes, giving involuntary manslaughter involving vehicular death the lowest penalty.
Absent a legislative amendment, an Ohio court's immediate response to these problems should be to require a finding of either reckless or negligent operation of a motor vehicle before an individual is
criminally sanctioned for causing another's death. However, if the Ohio

manslaughter.
In most traffic accidents the individual at fault is given a traffic citation which is usually for a
minor misdemeanor offense. The traffic laws encompass sections 4511.01 through 4511.99. With
the exception of approximately five divisions, a first offense involving these laws is a minor misde-

meanor. Id. § 4511.99 (Baldwin Supp. 1990). Generally, the five exceptions are: drunk driving (Q
4511.19 (Baldwin Supp. 1990)); driving with a suspended license (Q 4511.192 (Baldwin Supp.
1990)); drag racing on public roads (Q 4511.251 (Baldwin 1983)); placing injurious material on
the highway (§ 4511.74 (Baldwin 1983)); and failure to provide ignition interlock devices on vehicles used by persons with restricted driving privileges (Q 4511.83 (Baldwin Supp. 1990)). Id. §
4511.99(A)-(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1990).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 74-126.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 127-50.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 151-68.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 169-82.
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legislature fails to act and the courts insist on applying involuntary
manslaughter, the statute should be narrowly construed and resulting
penalties should be narrowly applied.
These proposals are based on: (1) the fact that the Ohio General
Assembly has acted in this area by enacting the vehicular homicide
related statutes; (2) "legislative history;" 1 6 (3) statutory construction
principles; and (4) the overall inconsistencies that result in the absence
of corrective action.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Historical Development of Vehicular Related Crimes

In 1974, the Ohio General Assembly revised and recodified Ohio's
criminal law, 17 which was the first comprehensive revision of the criminal laws since 1815.18 The 1974 revision enacted, for the first time,
separate statutes entitled "aggravated vehicular homicide"1 9 and "vehicular homicide." 0 The pertinent provisions of section 2903.06, aggravated vehicular homicide, provide:
(A) No person, while operating or participating in the operation of
16. References to "legislative history" are used loosely throughout this article. Ohio does
not have a formal requirement that a legislative history be kept. The Legislative Service Commission [hereinafter LSC], whose sole function is to serve the Ohio General Assembly collects the
legislators' bill files for microfilming. Those microfilms contain versions of bills which were not
enacted and are available for reference purposes at libraries which have purchased the LSC's bill
film. Telephone interview with Barbara Laughn, Ohio Legislative Service Commission. For information regarding bill analyses prepared by the LSC, see infra note 18.
17. H. No. 511, 1971-1972 Ohio Laws (pt. II) 1866. Although this bill was passed December, 1972, the effective date for most sections of the bill was January 1, 1974. Id. at 2035. See
generally Goldsmith, Involuntary Manslaughter: Review and Commentary on Ohio Law, 40 OHIO
ST. L.J. 569 (1979).
18. "The Act was not merely a recodification, but a comprehensive revision of the entire
substantive criminal law of Ohio, the first since 1815." In re Fox, 60 Ohio Misc. 31, 33 (C.P.
1979). Similar information was also contained in the LSC's analysis of House Bill 511 for the
109th General Assembly. The analysis stated that "[ajlthough there have been interim recodifications and revisions of the criminal law, there has been no complete revision since 1815, to which
date (or to as early as 1788) a major portion of Ohio's criminal statutes can trace their origin."
OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM'N, 109th General Assembly, H. No. 511 analysis (microfilm). The LSC
prepares analyses of bills, which are designed to assist members of the General Assembly by
placing before them nutshell versions of the various bills put to a vote for enactment. These analyses are not properly termed "legislative history" but are microfilmed for the convenience of the
public and available at purchasing libraries. Telephone interview with Barbara Laughn, Ohio Legislative Service Commission.
19. H. No. 511, supra note 17, § 2903.06, at 1901-02. This section was repealed and
amended by a subsequent Act prior to the 1974 effective date of House Bill 511. H. No. 716, 1973
Ohio Laws (pt. 1)1929 (codified as amended at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.06 (Baldwin Supp.
1990)).
20. H. No. 511, supra note 17, § 2903.07, at 1902. The original enactment of this section
was also repealed and amended. H. No. 716, supra note 19, at 1929 (codified as amended at OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.07 (Baldwin Supp. 1990)).
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a motor vehicle, motorcycle, snowmobile, locomotive, watercraft, or aircraft, shall recklessly cause the death of another.
(B) Whoever violates this section is
guilty of aggravated vehicular
21
homicide, a felony of the fourth degree.
The pertinent provisions of section 2903.07, vehicular homicide,
provide:
(A) No person, while operating or participating in the operation of
a motor vehicle, motorcycle, snowmobile, locomotive, watercraft, or aircraft, shall negligently cause the death of another.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of vehicular homicide, a
misdemeanor of the first degree.""
The 1974 recodification was not the first, but rather the third time
the Ohio General Assembly had segregated vehicular related homicides
in the criminal code. A manslaughter offense provided the first recognition of criminal responsibility for traffic related deaths and the motor
vehicle regulations the second. The historical development of the manslaughter offense and the General Assembly's switch from the criminal
code to the motor vehicle regulations for sanctioning vehicle related
deaths provide some insight into the enactment of the current vehicular
homicide related statutes.
The manslaughter provision of the 1835 Ohio Code was limited to
the commission of unlawful acts without malice that led unintentionally
to another's death."3 This particular manslaughter provision remained
in the Code until 1877.24
In 1935, the Ohio legislature classified manslaughter into first and
second degrees.2 8 Manslaughter in the first degree involved the unlawful killing of another without malice, thus, retaining the same language
as the manslaughter statutes in effect from 1877 until 1935.26 Manslaughter in the second degree involved the unlawful and unintentional
killing of another while violating any state law, including traffic regula-

21. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.06(A)-(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1990) (emphasis added).
22. Id. § 2903.07(A)-(B) (emphasis added).
23. 1835 Statutes of Ohio (Chase), ch. 830, § 3, at 1724.
24. Act of May.5, 1877, ch. 3, § 4, 1877 Ohio Laws 240, 244. This amendment deleted
"commission of an unlawful act" and changed the basis of the manslaughter offense to "[w ] hoever
unlawfully kills another" without malice. Id.
25. S. No. 290, §§ 12404, 12404-1, 1935 Ohio Laws 205 (repealed S. No. 29, 1941 Ohio
Laws 766, 804-05).
26. Id. § 12404. The first degree manslaughter statute provided, "[w]hoever unlawfully kills
another, except in the manner described in the next five preceding sections, is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree, and shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than one year nor
more than twenty years." Id. Basically, the "five
preceding sections" dealt with crimes of malice.
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tions.2 7 Although this was the first time that the Ohio manslaughter
offense specifically provided for deaths caused by operation of a vehicle,
Ohio courts had interpreted the pre-1935 manslaughter statutes to include deaths proximately caused by the use of a motor vehicle. 8 In
1941, the General Assembly passed the Uniform Traffic Act which had
the effect of removing the manslaughter in the second degree offense
from section 12404-1 and designating it as section 6307-18.29
In 1967, homicide by vehicle in the first degree was enacted (section 4511.181) and second degree manslaughter, section 4511.18 was
amended to homicide by vehicle in the second degree.30 There was no
specific reference to vehicle related deaths in chapter 29, the criminal
section of the Code.31 First degree homicide by vehicle applied where a
death proximately resulted from: (1) driving under the influence, (2)
reckless operation, (3) drag racing, or (4) reckless operation off the
street.32 Each of these causes involved some level of reckless conduct. A
charge of second degree homicide by vehicle resulted from a death
proximately caused by a violation of any traffic regulation, except those
specified for first degree homicide by vehicle.33

Id. § 12404-1. The second degree manslaughter statute provided:
Whoever shall unlawfully and unintentionally kill another while engaged in the violation of any law of this state applying to the use or regulation of traffic on, over or across
the roads or highways shall be guilty of manslaughter- in the second degree and shall be
fined not to exceed five hundred ($500.00) dollars or imprisoned in the county jail or workhouse not less than thirty days nor more than six months, or both, or imprisoned in the
penitentiary not less than one year nor more than twenty years.
27.

Id.
28. E.g., State v. O'Mara, 105 Ohio St. 94, 136 N.E. 885 (1922); Jackson v. State, 101
Ohio St. 152, 127 N.E. 870 (1920)..
29. S. No. 29, 1941 Ohio Laws 766, 804-05. Although section l.2404-1 was repealed by this
Act, replacement section 6307-18 was virtually identical. Compare S. No. 290, § 12404-1, 1935
Ohio Laws 205 with S. No. 29, supra, at 774. Apparently the General Assembly merely chose to
remove second degree manslaughter from the criminal section and incorporate it in the motor
vehicle section. First degree manslaughter was not repealed. It remained part of the codification of
criminal offenses as section 12404.
In 1953, the Ohio General Assembly passed legislation recodifying the General Code into the
Ohio Revised Code. H. No. 1, 1953-1954 Ohio Laws 7. Section 12404, first degree manslaughter
was recodified as section 2901.06 and section, 6307-18, second degree manslaughter, was recodified
as 4511.18. The text of these statutes was not altered by House bill I and section 2901.06 was not
amended prior to its repeal in 1973 by House Bill 511. H. No. 511, supra note 17, at 2032, 2034.
30. S. No. 37, 1967-1968 Ohio Laws (pt. lI-Il) 2128. Prior to this amendment section
4511.18 was entitled second degree manslaughter. For the text of the amendment and enactment,
see S. No. 37, supra (pt. I), at 1631-32.
31. Goldsmith, supra note 17, at 598.
32. 1967-1968 Ohio Laws (pt. 1) 1632. Each of the enumerated causes were separate traffic
violations: (1) driving under the influence-section 4511.19; (2) reckless operation-section
4511.20; (3) drag racing-section 4511.251; and (4) reckless operation off the street-section
4511.201.
33. 1967-1968 Ohio Laws (pt. 1) 1631-32.
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The 1974 revision of the Ohio criminal code deleted the first and
second degree homicide by vehicle statutes from chapter 4511. In their
place, the Ohio legislature enacted the criminal offenses of aggravated
vehicular homicide and vehicular homicide and added sections 2903.06
and 2903.07, respectfully, to chapter 29. 8" The involuntary manslaughter statute was enacted as part of the 1974 revision and was based on
either a felony or misdemeanor as the proximate cause of another's
death. 15
By 1983, the titles of sections 2903.06 and 2903.07 were changed.
Section 2903.06 became "Aggravated vehicular homicide; effects upon
penalties of being under influence of alcohol or drug abuse; repeat offenders." 6 The title to section 2903.07, relating to vehicular homicide,
was similarly changed.3 7 The statutory language added to both sections
consisted of the effect a finding of alcohol or drug use would have on
the sentencing for a conviction of either offense. Nevertheless, the underlying conduct remained "reckless" for aggravated vehicular homicide and "negligent" for vehicular homicide.3 8
In 1989, section 2903.06 underwent one revision and section
2903.07 was amended twice.3 9 In the first amendment, the substantive
changes to both sections were minor."' More significantly, aggravated
vehicular homicide, a felony of the fourth degree, was later amended in
1989 to an aggravated felony of the third degree. 1
B.

"Legislative Intent"42 of Vehicular Related Crimes
Since the 1974 revision and recodification of the criminal statutes

34. H. No. 511, supra note 17, at 1901 (amended by H. No. 716, supra note 19, at 1929)
(codified as amended at §§ 2903.06-.07 (Baldwin Supp. 1990)). Chapter 29 of the Ohio Revised
Code contains the classification of all crimes.
35. H. No. 511, supra note 17, at 1901 (codified as amended at § 2903.04 (Baldwin 1986)).
The first degree manslaughter offense of "unlawful killing" was replaced by involuntary
manslaughter.
36. S. No. 432, 1982 Ohio Legis. Serv. 500, 501 (Baldwin) (codified as amended at OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.06 (Baldwin Supp. 1990)).
37. Id. (codified as amended at OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.07 (Baldwin Supp. 1990)).
38. Id.

39.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

§§ 2903.06-.07 (Baldwin Supp. 1990).

40. H. No. 381, 1989 Ohio Legis. Serv. 366, 372 (Baldwin) (replaced "offender's operators
or chauffeurs license" with "offender's driver's or commercial driver's license").
41. S. No. 49, 1989 Ohio Legis. Serv. 621 (Baldwin) (codified as amended at OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2903.06 (Baldwin Supp. 1990)).
42. For a discussion of the legislative history of Ohio law, see supra note 16. Although a
formal legislative history does not exist in Ohio, reference to extrinsic materials is beneficial in
interpreting statutes. These extrinsic materials consist of proposed versions of enacted bills which
are not readily accessible. See supra note 16. In addition, the final report of the Technical Committee appointed to revise Ohio's criminal law is a valuable resource for determining legislative
intent. This report was published by the Ohio LSC. OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM'N, supra note 9. It
is a maxim of statutory construction that legislative intent gleaned from extrinsic material can not
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was so extensive, the Technical Committee in its final report prepared a
detailed set of comments. 48 The final report contains the text of each
proposed statute and the comments which provide general explanations
for each section, discussing the law as it existed and the effect of the
proposed changes. The Technical Committee's exact wording of the
proposed involuntary manslaughter and vehicular related homicide
statutes as included in House Bill 511, in its original form.
The Technical Committee's comments to section 2903.06, aggravated vehicular homicide, state that the statute expands the existing
law by including "the whole spectrum of reckless conduct in i[t]s purview, rather than basing liability on the violation of specific laws.' 4 In
accordance with section 2903.06, the prosecution would have to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct of the defendant was reckless, regardless of the motor vehicle regulation which had been violated. 8 For example, a defendant may be cited for operating a vehicle
in wanton disregard of the safety of others under section 4511.20.46
However, for guilt of aggravated vehicular homicide to be assessed
under section 2903.06, the jury would be required to determine
whether the defendant had driven recklessly.
Regardless of the ."reckless driving" label on the traffic citation,
the legislature intended that the criminal charge of aggravated vehicular homicide be determined by the criminal section's definition of
"reckless." "A person acts recklessly when with heedless indifference to
the consequences he perversely disregards a known risk that his conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain
nature."' 7 The Technical Committee's recodification comments addressed the definition of reckless:
reckless conduct is defined in proposed section 2901.22 (culpable mental
states) in the sense of rashness or heedless indifference to consequences.
This is not equivalent to reckless operation as defined in existing section
4511.20 of the Revised Code, which involves a lack of due regard for the

be interpreted in a manner that essentially nullifies a statute. 2A N. SINGER,

SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48.01 (4th ed. 1984). Thus, limitations exist on the use of bills which were

not enacted and committee reports, for determining legislative intent.
43. OHIO LEGis. SERV. COMM'N, supra note 9.
44. Id. at 76; see also § 2903.06 commentary (Baldwin Supp. 1990). The existing law to
which the Technical Committee referred was section 4911.181, first degree homicide by vehicle
for deaths resulting from drag racing, driving recklessly or driving while intoxicated. OHIO LEGIS.
SERV. COMM'N, supra note 9, at 76.
45. The beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof is mandated by statute. OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2901.05 (Baldwin 1986).
46. Id. § 4511.20 (Baldwin 1983). Wanton is not statutorily defined.
47. Id. § 2901.22(C) (Baldwin 1986).
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safety of persons or property.48

The distinction intended was a reckless mental state as opposed to reckless operation.49 In the absence of a reckless mental state, the driver
would not be guilty of aggravated vehicular homicide.
The Ohio legislature expanded the criminal scope for vehicular related deaths, yet limited the strict liability effect associated with the
repealed homicide by vehicle statutes. Any conduct involving the operation of a motor vehicle can give rise to a charge of aggravated vehicular
homicide, but only if that conduct is deemed reckless will it give rise to
a conviction. A mere violation of a specific traffic regulation is no
longer enough to convict someone of aggravated vehicular homicide. By
enacting section 2903.06 to replace section 4911.181, the General Assembly intended that only those persons who were found to have caused
the death of another by recklessly operating their vehicle be subject to
the penal code. "[T]he proposed offense [aggravated vehicular homicide] does not predicate liability on the violation of a safety statute, but
on recklessness." 50
The Technical Committee's proposed vehicular homicide statute,
section 2903.07, required a finding of negligence rather than recklessness. 51 For the purposes of vehicular homicide, section 2901.22(D) of
the Ohio Revised Code defines negligent conduct as: "[a] person acts
negligently when, because of a substantial lapse from due care, he fails
to perceive or avoid a risk that his conduct may cause a certain result
or may be of a certain nature."5 2 The LSC's 1973 commentary following this statutory section in the Ohio Revised Code distinguished criminal negligence from civil negligence:
Although the definition of "negligence" in the new code is structured
similarly to the definition of ordinary negligence used in tort law, it defines a higher degree of negligence than ordinary negligence. For one to
be negligent under this section he must be guilty of a substantial departure from due care, whereas ordinary negligence merely requires a fail-

48. OHIo LEGIS. SERV. COMM'N, supra note 9, at 76. Section'4511.20 was amended, effective March, 1983 and "willful or wanton disregard" was substituted for "without due regard for."
S. No. 432, supra note 36, at 508. Section 4511.20 is referred .to as the reckless operation statute.
E.g., State v. Earlenbaugh, 18 Ohio St. 3d 19, 22, 479 N.E.2d 846, 849 (1985).
49. Section 4511.20 was amended, effective 1983, to "willful or wanton disregard." S. No.
432, supra note 36, at 500.
50. OHIO LEGIS. SERv. COMM'N, supra note 9, at 76. Through two revisions of House Bill
511 there were no amendments to the proposed aggravated vehicular homicide offense, which
became enacted law.
51.- Id. at 76-77. The statute was enacted in accordance with the proposed language. H. No.
511, supra note 17, § 2903.07, at 1902 (codified as amended at § 2903.07 (Baldwin Supp. 1990)).
52. OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.22(D) (Baldwin 1986).
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ure to exercise due care."
In most states, negligent conduct is a higher standard in the criminal
context than negligence giving rise to civil liability.' The vehicular
homicide statute, that requires a finding of criminal negligence, is a
55
lesser included offense of aggravated vehicular homicide. Aggravated
vehicular homicide requires a finding of recklessness which is a higher
standard than negligence in the criminal context.
The Technical Committee's comments to proposed section 2903.07
are insightful. The comments state that "the offense [of vehicular
homicide] is based on the negligence of the operator, rather than upon
his violation of a rule governing the operation of the vehicle involved."' 57 This requires a finding of negligence regardless of whether
the defendant violated any specific traffic regulations. As in the aggravated vehicular homicide statute, this statute limits and expands the
prior offense of second degree homicide by vehicle. Any traffic violation
resulting in another's death, except those associated with first degree
homicide by vehicle, was per se second degree homicide by vehicle
under the 1967 statute.
The 1974 vehicular homicide statute encompassed all operations of
a motor vehicle that proximately caused the death of another. However, that alone will not lead to a conviction. The individual charged
with vehicular homicide must be adjudged to have acted negligently to
58
be convicted, a limitation not present in the 1967 statute. Thus, it is
possible for an individual to be guilty of vehicular homicide by driving
negligently without having violated any traffic regulations. The expansion resulting from the 1974 revision is that now a culpable mental
state is the sole basis of the offense. Violation of a traffic regulation is
no longer a required element.

53. Id. § 2901.22 commentary.
54. 2 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 7.12 (1986).
55. "[W]here it would be possible for the same evidence to prove both a greater offense and
a lesser offense depending solely upon the culpable mental state of the accused, the lesser offense
is a lesser included offense of the greater offense ...." State v. Banks, 31 Ohio App. 3d 57, 63,
508 N.E.2d 986, 993 (1986). State v. Chippendale, 52 Ohio St. 3d 118, 119 (1990) (referring to
vehicular homicide as a lesser included offense of aggravated vehicular homicide); see OHIO
LEGIs. SERV. COMM'N, supra note 9, at 77 ("Proposed [vehicular homicide] is a lesser included
offense to proposed . . .Aggravated vehicular homicide."). "When the indictment or information
charges an offense, including different degrees, or if other offenses-are included within the offense
charged, the jury may find the defendant not guilty of the degree charged but guilty of an inferior
degree thereof or lesser included offense." § 2945.74 (Baldwin 1986).
56. Compare § 2901.22(C) (Baldwin 1986) ("perversely disregards a known risk") with id.
§ 2901.22(D) ("fails to perceive or avoid a risk").
57. OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM'N, supra note 9, at 77 (emphasis added). The proposed vehicular homicide offense became law without revision.
58. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.07 commentary (Baldwin 1986).
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On balance though, the requirement of a finding of negligence is a
sounder approach to assessing a term of imprisonment than the per se
approach. Accidents do happen. This premise is supported by the fact
that a defendant must have the requisite mental state to be guilty of
killing another in a traffic accident. The LSC's commentary following
the definition of "negligence," in the Ohio Revised Code, clearly recognizes the concept of "accident" without fault by distinguishing vehicular homicide "negligence" from "ordinary negligence." 5 9 Accidents
caused by "ordinary negligence" are not punishable under Ohio's criminal laws.
In addition, the Technical Committee's comments to the recodification, referring to prior law, provide that a "[v]iolation of a traffic law
.. .may or may not amount to negligence-if the law states a specific
rule of conduct, its violation is negligence per se."60 This comment and
the preceding one support the interpretation that the offense was intended to be based solely on the operator's negligence. 1 If the violation
of a motor vehicle regulation resulted in negligence per se, it would
preclude the jury from determining whether the conduct which resulted
in death was negligent conduct. Under prior law, section 4511.18, second degree homicide by vehicle, violating any traffic regulation and
proximately causing the death of another, resulted in an automatic conviction.6 2 Vehicular homicide was proposed and enacted as a complete
reversal of second degree homicide by vehicle which House Bill 511
repealed." The plain meaning of the vehicular homicide statute, consistent with its "legislative history," requires a finding of negligence in
order for guilt to be assessed.
C. "Legislative Intent" of Involuntary Manslaughter in Connection
with Traffic Fatalities

The Technical Committee's proposed section 2903.03(A)-(D) set
forth the crime of manslaughter which provided that:
(A) No person, while under extreme emotional stress for which
there is reasonable explanation or excuse, shall knowingly cause the
death of another. The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall
be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the offender's situation
at the time of the offense, under circumstances as he believed them to
be.

59.

Id. § 2901.22 commentary.
OHIo LEGIs. SERV. COMM'N, supra note 9, at 77.
61. See supra text accompanying note 57.
62. This is the identical effect application of involuntary manslaughter has when used in
connection with traffic fatalities. See infra text accompanying notes 76-80.
63. H. No. 511, supra note 17, at 2033-34.

60.
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(B) No person shall recklessly cause the death of another. An offense under section 2903.05 of the Revised Code does not constitute an
offense under this division.
(C) No person shall cause the death of another by committing any
offense of violence. An offense under section 2903.05 or 2903.06 of the
Revised Code does not constitute an offense under this division.
(D) Whoever violates this section is guilty of manslaughter, a felony
of the third degree.6 '
Division C was the only provision that did not specify a culpable
mental state. However, "offense of violence" was defined in proposed
section 2901.01(I).65 Each offense of violence is premised on a violation
of another crime. For example, commission of a battery under proposed
section 2903.13 requires infliction of reckless or negligent harm and is
defined as an offense of violence."' In essence, one could not be convicted under proposed section 2903.03(C) without a finding of culpability. The comments to this section state, "[d]ivision (C) is silent on the
question of culpability, but strict liability is not imposed because the
culpable mental state required for commission of the offense of violence
involved would apply."'6 7 The original House Bill 511 contained the
s
identical statutory language as proposed section 2903.03.6 In Substitute House Bill 511, the first revision to House Bill 511, the original
manslaughter provision was divided into two statutory crimes, manslaughter (section 2903.03) and involuntary manslaughter (section
2903.04). Substitute House Bill 511 provided:
Sec. 2903.03 (A) No person, while under extreme emotional stress
brought on by serious provocation reasonably sufficient to incite him into
using deadly force, shall knowingly cause the death of another.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of voluntary manslaugh:ter, a felony of the first degree.
Sec. 2903.04 (A) No person shall recklessly cause the death of another. An offense under section 2903.06 of the revised code does not constitute an offense under this section.
(B) Whoever violates this section6 9 is guilty of involuntary manslaughter, a felony of the third degree.
Divisions (A) and (C) of the original bill were deleted. The General

OHIo LEGIS. SERV. COMM'N, supra note 9, at 73.
65. Id. at 19.
66. Id. at 19, 80.
67. Id. at 74.
68. The original bill is in a bound volume at the Ohio Supreme Court library and the text of
the statute is also found in the Technical Committee's final report published by the Ohio LSC.
See id.at 73.
69. Sub. H. No. 511 (available on microfilm from a library which has purchased the Ohio
LSC's bill film, discussed at supra note 16).

64.
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Assembly did not enact Substitute House Bill 511 and instead enacted
Amended Substitute House Bill 511, the second revision to House Bill
511 . The involuntary manslaughter statute enacted by the General
Assembly in 1973 by the passage of Amended Substitute House Bill
511 is identical to current section 2903.04(A)-(B).1
The proposed manslaughter statute specifically excluded the proposed aggravated and vehicular homicide statutes from its coverage.
The exclusionary language was not included in the enacted versions of
manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter. However, the enacted
statutes constituted a wholesale change from the proposed law. The
Technical Committee did not propose an involuntary manslaughter
statute. Furthermore, the proposed manslaughter statute was premised
on culpable mental states, an aspect which is glaringly absent from the
General Assembly's enactment. Section 2903.04 is premised solely on
the commission of either a misdemeanor or felony. Despite the Technical Committee's recommendations to depart from "unlawfully killing
another" as the basis for manslaughter, the General Assembly basically
retained the existing law. 2
The comments relating to the two proposed vehicular homicide offenses do not explicitly state whether involuntary manslaughter has any
application to traffic fatalities. However, the Technical Committee envisioned a completely different structure for manslaughter which did
not include involuntary manslaughter and based guilt on specific
mental states. In addition the proposed manslaughter statute did not
apply to the vehicular related homicide offenses, thus it would have
been redundant to exclude manslaughter from those sections. Therefore, the existence of the exclusionary language in the proposed manslaughter offense and the lack of exclusionary language from the proposed vehicular homicide offenses have no bearing on legislative intent.
The only clear legislative intent is that the General Assembly rejected
a manslaughter statute based on the existence of a specific mental
state. The overlap of the involuntary manslaughter and vehicular related homicide statutes cannot be resolved on the basis of the legislature's deletion of the exclusionary language contained in the proposed

70. H. No. 511, supra note 17, at 1901.
71. Compare id. with § 2903.04 (Baldwin 1986). Section (C) originally provided that misdemeanor involuntary manslaughter was a felony of the third degree which was subsequently
amended to an aggravated felony of the third degree. S. No. 199, 1982 Legis. Serv. 363, 369
(Baldwin).
72. First degree manslaughter constituted the unlawful killing of another. This statute was
repealed, effective 1973, by House bill 511. See supra notes 29, 32. Killing someone during the
commission of a misdemeanor or felony is virtually synonymous with "unlawful killing," yet perhaps a little less ambiguous. For a discussion of the Technical Committee's emphasis on culpability in drafting the proposed criminal code, see infra note 74.
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manslaughter statute.
Nevertheless, by drafting separate sections for vehicular related
deaths, it would appear that the Ohio legislature intended to make aggravated vehicular homicide and vehicular homicide distinct offenses
from involuntary manslaughter. More significantly, it is apparent that
the Ohio legislature intended for individuals to be punished for fatalities proximately caused by their operation of a motor vehicle only if
they possessed the requisite culpable mental state, either recklessness or
negligence.
III.

INVOLUNTARY

MANSLAUGHTER AND VEHICULAR RELATED

DEATHS

Involuntary manslaughter, aggravated vehicular homicide and vehicular homicide are three separate crimes, with vehicular homicide a
lesser included offense of aggravated vehicular homicide.7" If the jury is
unable to conclude that the defendant acted recklessly, they may find
that he acted negligently. In the absence of either a reckless or negligent mental state, the prosecution should not be allowed to also submit
the offense of involuntary manslaughter to the jury for a death involving a motor vehicle. The four reasons for this conclusion are discussed
separately in subsection A of this section. Section IV proposes legislative and judicial solutions to the problems raised in section III.
A. Application of Involuntary ManslaughterRenders the Aggravated
Vehicular Homicide and Vehicular Homicide Statutes Nugatory
The Ohio legislature segregated vehicular homicide and aggravated vehicular homicide from involuntary manslaughter and negligent
homicide as separate criminal offenses. As evidenced by the legislative
history of these two statutes, the Ohio General Assembly intended that
convictions for deaths resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle
depend upon a specific mental state."4 The Ohio legislature repealed
the first and second degree homicide by vehicle offenses which did not
73. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.04 (Baldwin 1986) (involuntary manslaughter); Id. §
2903.06 (Baldwin Supp. 1990) (aggravated vehicular homicide); id. § 2903.07 (vehicular
homicide).
74. The Ohio LSC's analysis for House Bill 511, outlining the proposed revisions to the
criminal code, stated:
Two vehicular homicide offenses are included, both dealing with killing another while
operating a motor vehicle, motorcycle, locomotive, watercraft, or aircraft. The difference
between the two is that the aggravated offense is committed recklessly, while the less serious offense is committed negligently. Existing law connects the offense to killing another as
the result of violating various traffic laws, rather than on the recklessness or negligence of
the offender.
OHIO LEGIS. SERv. COMM'N, 109th General Assembly, H. No. 511 analysis (available on microfilm from purchasing libraries; discussed supra note 18).
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require a culpable mental state.7 ' If the Ohio legislature was satisfied
with those statutes, it would not have enacted the two current offenses.
Involuntary manslaughter results from the commission of any felony or misdemeanor which causes the death of another.7 6 Violation of
most of the traffic regulations enacted under chapter 4511 are minor
misdemeanors." Therefore, a violation of most traffic regulations would
result in an involuntary manslaughter charge if the violation proximately caused another's death. Yet, at the time of recodification first
and second degree homicide were statutory crimes which collectively
resulted from the violation of any traffic regulation that proximately
caused the death of another. These statutes were repealed and replaced
by aggravated and vehicular homicide. Consequently, there was no purpose for enacting the aggravated vehicular homicide and vehicular
homicide statutes. The state simply could have charged anyone who
killed another by violating a traffic regulation with involuntary manslaughter and accomplished the same ends.78 However, there is a sharp
distinction in the means employed by the current statutes to reach the
end result of a criminal conviction. Involuntary manslaughter does not
require any culpable mental state and essentially results in strict criminal liability. 9

75.
76.
77.

H. No. 511, supra note 17, at 2033-34 (repealing §§ 4511.18, 4511.181).
§ 2903.04 (Baldwin 1986).
§ 4511.99 (Baldwin Supp. 1990) (penalty provisions for traffic offenses); see supra note

11.
78. In the alternative, the General Assembly could have retained the first and second degree
homicide by vehicle statutes in its recodification.
79. All that is necessary is proof that the defendant violated a traffic regulation and proof of
the victim's death. In revising Ohio's criminal laws, the Technical Committee stated in the introductory portion of its final report:
It has been said that the rule that conduct is not criminal unless the perpetrator has
the mens rea, the guilty mind, is the hallmark of civilized law ....
Following current
trends in criminal code revision, the Technical Committee has distilled culpable mental
states into four degrees-purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence-which it considers as the linchpins of the entire proposed code.
The fundamental rule that, generally, a person is not guilty of a criminal offense unless he not only did the prohibited act but had a certain guilty state of mind when he did it,
is codified by the proposed code. In addition, with respect to those offenses for which a
culpable mental state is not specified, the code provides a uniform rule for imposing strict
liability, or for establishing an appropriate degree of culpability where legislative intent to
impose strict liability is not readily apparent.
The definitions of purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence are the keystone of
the proposed criminal code, and every offense was drafted with them consciously in mind.
Nearly every offense has a culpable mental state attached to at least one element, and in
those offenses which do not specify culpability, the Committee has taken pains to show that
strict liability is intended.
OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM'N, supra note 9, at x.
By proposing a manslaughter statute based on specific mental states the Technical Commit-
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The courts should be aware of this distinction in the means and
give deference to the legislature, who must have drafted sections
2903.06 and 2903.07 for the purpose of governing vehicular related
homicides. As a result, someone who kills another while operating a
motor vehicle should be charged under the vehicular related homicide
statutes and not involuntary manslaughter.
A defendant cannot be convicted for separate offenses based on the
identical underlying conduct. 80 Thus, a defendant could not be convicted of both aggravated vehicular homicide and involuntary manslaughter for the death of another which resulted from reckless operation of a motor vehicle. Yet, in numerous situations an individual
charged with aggravated vehicular homicide or vehicular homicide
could also be -chargedwith involuntary manslaughter." These situations could arise because conduct which serves as the basis of a charge
of either reckless or negligent operation of a motor vehicle often is the
result of a traffic violation, most of which are classified as minor
misdemeanors.8 2
The Ohio courts are applying involuntary manslaughter and disre83
garding the vehicular related homicide statutes. The effect of misapplying and misinterpreting these statutes is to render the aggravated
vehicular homicide and vehicular homicide statutes nugatory. For example, in State v. Centers,84 the defendant crossed over the center line
of a highway and struck a vehicle traveling in the opposite direction.
85
The driver of the other vehicle was killed in the accident. The defendant was charged with aggravated vehicular homicide, vehicular homicide and involuntary manslaughter. The underlying misdemeanor for
the charge of involuntary manslaughter was Ohio Revised Code section
4511.25, prohibiting drivers from crossing over the center line of a
6
highway with traffic traveling in opposite directions."
Mr. Centers was acquitted of aggravated vehicular homicide and

tee did not intend to impose strict liability. However, the General Assembly rejected the proposed
manslaughter offense and enacted an involuntary manslaughter statute devoid of any requisite
mental state.
80. § 2941.25(A) (Baldwin 1986). The statute provides that, "[wihere the same conduct by
defendant can be construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may be convicted
of only one." Id.
81. See cases cited supra note 6.
82. See supra note 11.
83. E.g., State v. Chippendale, 52 Ohio St. 3d 118, 556 N.E.2d 1134 (1990); State v. Centers, No. 9380 (Ohio Ct. App. May 19, 1986) (LEXIS, Ohio library, App file); State v. Davis, 13
Ohio App. 3d 265, 469 N.E.2d 83 (1983).
84. No. 9380 (Ohio Ct. App. May 19, 1986) (LEXIS, Ohio library, App file).
85. Id.
86. Id.
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vehicular homicide because the jury did not believe that by crossing
over the center line, Mr. Centers acted recklessly or negligently. 87
However, the court allowed the prosecution to submit the offense of
involuntary manslaughter to the jury. Mr. Centers was convicted of involuntary manslaughter based upon the language of that statute that
"'[n]o person shall cause the death of another as a proximate result of
the offender's committing or attempting to commit a misdemeanor.' "88
Tragically, Mr. Centers did kill someone while committing the misdemeanor of crossing over the center line.89 However, since the jury found
that his conduct was neither reckless nor negligent, he should not have
been convicted of any criminal offenses. Given this result, the state
could have prosecuted Mr. Centers under involuntary manslaughter
alone. In effect, the vehicular homicide related statutes were rendered
useless, a tragedy for Mr. Centers.
State v. Davis"' is another example of an Ohio court rendering the
vehicular homicide related statutes useless by applying the involuntary
manslaughter statute. In Davis, the defendant's vehicle collided headon with another vehicle, killing a passenger. Defendant Davis was
charged with aggravated vehicular homicide and involuntary manslaughter. 91 The involuntary manslaughter charge was based on three
misdemeanors: (1) driving while under the influence; (2) reckless operation; and (3) driving left of center." The jury found that the defendant's conduct did not constitute recklessness or negligence and acquitted him of aggravated vehicular homicide and its lesser included
offense of vehicular homicide. However, the jury convicted him of involuntary manslaughter without specifying which of the three underlying misdemeanors he violated. 9"
Mr. Davis based his appeal of the involuntary manslaughter conviction on the lack of sufficient evidence necessary to support a viola-

87.

Id.

88.

Id. (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.04(B) (Baldwin 1986)); OHIO REV. CODE
§ 2903.04(C) (Baldwin 1986) ("Whoever violates this section is guilty of involuntary
manslaughter.").
89. The interesting twist to this case is that violation of section 4511.25, crossing the center
line, is a misdemeanor punishable by a one-hundred dollar fine. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
4511.99(D), 2929.21(D) (Baldwin Supp. 1990).
90. 13 Ohio App. 3d 265, 469 N.E.2d 83 (1983).
91. Id. at 266, 469 N.E.2d at 84.
92. Id. at 266-67, 469 N.E.2d at 86. All three of these misdemeanors are found in chapter
45, the motor vehicle regulations: (1) driving while under the influence-section 4511.19; (2)
reckless operation-section 4511.20; and (3) driving left of center-section 4511.25. Reckless operation and driving left of center are minor misdemeanors. § 4511.99(D) (Baldwin Supp. 1990).
Section 4511.20 was amended, effective 1983, substituting "willful or wanton disregard on the
highways" for "without due regard for." S. No. 432, supra note 36, at 508.
93. 13 Ohio App. 3d at 268, 469 N.E.2d at 86.
ANN.
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9
tion of any of the three misdemeanors. The Clark County Court of
to
Appeals determined that there was sufficient evidence for the 9jury
5 This
misdemeanors.
the
of
each
find that the defendant had violated
conclusion is inconsistent with the jury's finding that the defendant was
not guilty of aggravated vehicular homicide or vehicular homicide. If
the jury had found, based on the evidence, that the defendant was driving while under the influence, it would seem that the same evidence
would establish that the defendant had acted recklessly or at the very
least, negligently. 6 The second misdemeanor, reckless operation, if
proven would probably have resulted in a conviction under aggravated
vehicular homicide as well. In all likelihood, the jury did not convict
Mr. Davis of involuntary manslaughter for either driving under the influence or reckless operation.
Crossing the center line is the only misdemeanor of the three Mr.
Davis was charged with which probably was the basis for the jury's
conviction. Mr. Davis was southbound and the vehicle he struck was
traveling north. Mr. Davis testified that he was not sure which side of
97
the road he was on at the time of impact. Given this evidence, it was
possible for the jury to conclude that either the victim or the defendant
crossed the center line. Since crossing the center line is a misdemeanor 98 and the commission of that misdemeanor resulted in another's death, it is the most probable basis for the jury's conviction on
involuntary manslaughter. The fundamental flaw in the outcome of Mr.
Davis' case was that his conviction was not linked to the culpable
mental states of either recklessness or negligence as provided by the
Ohio General Assembly.
As the Centers and Davis cases demonstrate, there is no reason to
retain aggravated vehicular homicide or vehicular homicide in the Ohio
criminal code. The Ohio General Assembly in 1974, however, did enact
the vehicular related homicide statutes. Arguably, the legislature must
have determined that these statutes would serve a purpose in the enforcement of laws and the shaping of societal conduct. Presumably,
that purpose is to punish reckless or negligent operation of a motor
vehicle which results in the death of another. Involuntary manslaughter

94. Id. at 267, 469 N.E.2d at 86.
95. Id. at 268, 469 N.E.2d at 86.
96. See, e.g., State v. Kavlich, 33 Ohio App. 3d 240, 245, 515 N.E.2d 652, 656 (1986)
(driving under the influence constituted recklessness for aggravated vehicular homicide conviction); State v. Stinson, 21 Ohio App. 3d 14, 16, 486 N.E.2d 831, 834 (1984) (aggravated vehicular conviction upheld based on evidence of driving under the influence). Based on these examples,
driving under the influence, likewise would constitute negligence since recklessness is a higher
standard.
97. 13 Ohio App. 3d at 268, 469 N.E.2d at 86.
98. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.25 (Baldwin 1983).
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should not apply to deaths resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle because of the overriding effect it has on the plain language and
purpose of the vehicular homicide related statutes. Since the courts
have no authority to repeal the vehicular related homicide statutes,
their decisions should not produce that effect."
Each statute should be interpreted in a manner which gives effect
to its provisions.1"' There is a presumption that the legislature enacted
each statute with good reason and would have repealed any statute
which it intended to be nullified."0 1 In the situation where there are
statutes with overlapping provisions, these should be interpreted, if possible, so as to give effect to both. 02 If effect cannot be given to both
statutes, then the specific statute governs over the general statute. 03
Section 1.51 of Ohio's General Provisions, entitled "Special or local provision prevails over general; exception," states:
If a general provision conflicts with a special or local provision, they shall
be construed, if possible, so that effect is given to both. If the conflict
between the provisions is irreconcilable, the special or local provision
prevails as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is the later adoption and the manifest intent is that the general
provision prevail.'"
In accordance with section 1.51, both aggravated vehicular homicide
and vehicular homicide should prevail over involuntary manslaughter.
A conviction under the vehicular homicide statutes can only occur
when death is proximately caused by reckless or negligent operation of
a motor vehicle. 1°5 These statutes are specific in scope. In contrast, involuntary manslaughter is a general statute which arises when the resulting death was proximately caused by committing or attempting to
commit a felony or misdemeanor. 06 The violation of a traffic regulation
99. E.g., State v. Chippendale, 52 Ohio St. 3d 118, 556 N.E.2d 1134 (1990); State v. Centers, No. 9380 (Ohio Ct. App. May 19, 1986) (LEXIS, Ohio library, App file); State v. Davis, 13
Ohio App. 3d 265, 469 N.E.2d 83 (1983).
100. 2A N. SINGER, supra note 42, § 46.06. "A statute should be construed so that affect is
given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant
."Id. (footnotes omitted).
101. See IA id. § 23.09.
102. 2A id. § 51.05.
103. Id.; State v. Chippendale, 52 Ohio St. 3d. 118, 120, 556 N.E. 2d. 1134, 1136 (1990).
("It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that specific statutory provisions prevail over conflicting general statutes.")
104. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.51 (Baldwin 1986).
105. § 2903.06-.07 (Baldwin Supp. 1990).
106. § 2903.04 (Baldwin 1986). The Ohio Supreme Court has stated, "R.C. 2903.04(B),
which pertains to the commission of a misdemeanor that proximately causes the death of another,
is a general provision. On the other hand, R.C. 2903.06 and 2903.07, which pertain to recklessly
or negligently causing the death of another while operating a specified vehicle, are special provi-
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is only a small portion of the conduct which would fall within the purview of involuntary manslaughter.10 7 The fact that the legislature enacted the specific statutes governing traffic related homicides establishes that their manifest intent was not for the general statute to
prevail.
The Warren County Court of Appeals reached this conclusion in
State v. Chippendale08 and reversed the defendant's conviction for involuntary manslaughter. After attempting to stop at a stop sign, defendant's vehicle collided with another vehicle traveling through the intersection. A passenger in the other vehicle was killed as a result of the
impact.10 9 The defendant was indicted for aggravated vehicular homicide, vehicular homicide, and involuntary manslaughter. The underlying misdemeanor for the involuntary manslaughter charge resulted
from driving while under the influence. However, at the accident site
the police did not administer a sobriety test, even though the defendant
admitted that he had been drinking. The jury acquitted the defendant
of aggravated vehicular homicide but convicted him of involuntary
manslaughter and vehicular homicide, the lesser included offense. He
1 10
was sentenced on the involuntary manslaughter charge.
The court held that the statutory crime of involuntary manslaughter did not encompass deaths resulting from the violation of any traffic
laws classified as misdemeanors. 1 1 It limited the state to bringing
charges under either the aggravated vehicular homicide or vehicular
" 2 and
homicide statute. In its opinion the court cited State v. Volpe
quoted Ohio Revised Code section 1.51 to support its proposition that
the rules of statutory construction require that the specific statutes of
aggravated and vehicular homicide govern over the general statute of

sions." State v. Chippendale, 52 Ohio St. 3d 118, 121, 556 N.E.2d 1134, 1137 (1990) (footnotes
omitted).
107. The chapters on crimes include homicide and assault; kidnapping and extortion; arson
and related offenses; robbery, burglary and trespass; offenses against the public peace; offenses
against the family; and drug offenses. These separate chapters contain statutes classified as felonies and misdemeanors. Aside from- the criminal statutes, and traffic laws, violation of other statutory provisions are classified as felonies and misdemeanors which could serve as the basis for an
involuntary manslaughter charge. E.g. § 3737.99(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1990) (section 3737.51 a
knowing violation of state fire code is a first degree misdemeanor); id. § 3743.99(C) (Baldwin
1989) (discharging fireworks in violation of section 3743.65(B) is a first degree misdemeanor); id.
§ 3734.99 (A) (Baldwin Supp. 1990) (a violation of section 3734.03 (Baldwin Supp. 1990), burning or dumping solid wastes, results in a felony charge).
108. No. 88-07-054 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 6, 1989) (LEXIS, Ohio library, App file), reversed, 52 Ohio St. 3d 118, 556 N.E.2d 1134 (1990).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. 38 Ohio St. 3d 191, 527 N.E.2d 818 (1988).
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involuntary manslaughter.'1 I
The state's argument was based on the Davis decision which concluded that involuntary manslaughter was applicable since the General
Assembly deleted the language of the bill that would have made it inapplicable. The Davis court stated:
The legislative. history of the involuntary manslaughter provision
reveals the House Bill as originally submitted imposed liability for the
death of another through the commission of any offense other than aggravated vehicular homicide or vehicular homicide.
The legislature in enacting the final involuntary manslaughter provision rejected this language.
Thus, the legislature was given the opportunity to exclude vehicular
deaths from the involuntary manslaughter statute and chose not to do so.
It is our opinion this clearly speaks of the legislature's intent to permit a
charge of manslaughter against persons involved in vehicular fatalities
despite the more specific provisions for aggravated vehicular and vehicular homicide."'
The Davis court's opinion was based on a quotation from the Goldsmith article," 5 which the court cited as the language of the involuntary manslaughter provision in Substitute House bill 511. However, the
language the court quoted is not from the involuntary manslaughter
offense contained in Substitute House bill 511. 1 The quoted language
was taken from the substitute bill, but defined negligent homicide, section 2903.05(B), in its amended form. This proposed amendment to
negligent homicide resembled division (C) of the proposed involuntary
manslaughter offense in the original House Bill 511.1' The Davis court

113. Chippendale, No. 88-07-054 (LEXIS, Ohio library, App file).
114. Davis, 13 Ohio App. 3d at 269-70, 469 N.E.2d at 88.
115. Goldsmith, supra note 9.
116. Compare supra text accompanying note 69 with Davis, 13 Ohio App. 3d at 269-70,
469 N.E.2d at 88.
117. Compare supra text accompanying note 64 (§ 2903.03(C) with "(B) No person shall
cause the death of another by committing any offense. An offense under 2903.06 or 2903.07 of the
Revised Code does not constitute an offense under this division." Sub. H. No. 511, § 2903.05
(available on microfilm from a library which has purchased the Ohio LSC's bill film, discussed at
supra note 18). Division (C) of the proposed involuntary manslaughter offense was limited to an
offense of violence. See supra text accompanying notes 64-67. Division (C) was deleted from the
amended involuntary manslaughter section contained in Substitute House Bill 511. See supra text
accompanying notes 69-70. The enacted language of section 2903.05, negligent homicide, is limited to "negligently caus[ing] the death of another by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous
ordinance." H. No. 511, supra note 17, § 2903.05, at 1901 (codified as amended at § 2903.05
(Baldwin 1986)). '
Both the original House Bill 511 and Substitute House bill 511 contained language excluding
aggravated vehicular homicide from involuntary manslaughter. See supra text accompanying
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carelessly cited the legislative history of negligent homicide to support
its position that the legislative history of involuntary manslaughter indicates that the General Assembly endorsed the application of involuntary manslaughter to vehicular related homicides. In addition to the
court's inaccurate rendition of legislative history, the court failed to
point out that the General Assembly enacted a manslaughter statute
fundamentally different than the one it attempts to quote. There is no
foundation for the Davis court's conclusion based on legislative
history. " '
In responding to the state's reliance on Davis, the Chippendale
court traced the historical development of the 1974 involuntary manslaughter statute and cited the Goldsmith article as the source of legislative history. Fortunately the court reached the right decision by precluding the application of involuntary manslaughter.
Unfortunately, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Warren
County Court of Appeals decision in Chippendale."' The court began
its analysis with, "[lt is a well-established principle of statutory construction that specific statutory provisions prevail over conflicting general statutes."12 0 The Ohio Supreme Court, using section 1.51, determined that involuntary manslaughter is a general provision and
aggravated vehicular and vehicular homicide were special provisions.12'
The court then determined that involuntary manslaughter and the vehicular related homicides were allied offenses, 22 making section 1.51
applicable.
In applying section 1.51 the court first looked to the exception that
"[i]f the conflict between the provisions is irreconcilable, the special
.. . provision prevails as an exception to the general provision, unless
.. . the manifest intent is that the general provision prevail."' 23 By
undertaking this analysis the court recognized the irreconcilability between involuntary manslaughter and the vehicular related homicide
notes 64, 69. The Davis court may have been attempting to quote this exclusionary language as
the basis of its reasoning. However, if the court had accurately referenced the legislative history of
involuntary manslaughter it would have been of little value since the General Assembly enacted
an involuntary manslaughter statute that bears no resemblance to its legislative history. Therefore,
it is an unsound conclusion that the deletion of the exclusionary language represents the General
Assembly's intent. See supra text accompanying notes 71-73. The General Assembly deleted the
entire proposed offense to which the exclusionary language related.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 71-73.
119. 52 Ohio St. 3d 118, 556 N.E.2d 1134 (1990).
120. Id. at 120, 556 N.E.2d at 1136.
121. Id. at 121, 556 N.E.2d at 1137.

122. Id. Allied offenses are offenses in which "'the elements of the offenses [must] correspond to such a degree that the commission of one crime will result in the commission of the
other.'" Id. at 120 (quoting Newark v. Vazirani, 48 Ohio St. 3d 81, 549 N.E.2d 520 (1990)).
123. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.51 (Baldwin 1986) (emphasis added).
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statutes. "[WIhere a general and a special provision cover the same
conduct, the legislature may expressly mandate that such provisions
are to run coextensively." 1 4 Relying on Davis and the Goldsmith article, the court concluded that legislative history manifested the intent
that one could be charged with involuntary manslaughter for traffic fatalities. Thus, the mistakes made by the Davis court in attempting to
identify legislative history were compounded. The entire basis of the
court's holding rests on inaccurate references to the informal legislative
history of involuntary manslaughter which is inapplicable. This, the
court contends is manifest intent of an express mandate.
In his article, Mr. Goldsmith cited earlier versions of House Bill
511 which were never enacted. 125 The Davis and Chippendale courts
based their decisions, relying on Mr. Goldsmith's analysis of legislative
history. The danger in such a practice is apparent and reliance on one
individual's interpretation of what they read should not be referred to
as "legislative history." Although proposed versions of bills are not easily accessible for historical reference, 2 6 courts who base decisions on
legislative history must refer to the actual documents to avoid erroneous conclusions. Corrective action is required to avoid further nullification of the aggravated vehicular homicide and vehicular homicide
statutes.
B. Application of Involuntary ManslaughterInstead of the Vehicular
Homicide Related Statutes Distorts the Penalty Structure
In addition to the nugatory effect caused by the overlap of all
three statutes to the same conduct, the penalty for violating each indicates that the Ohio legislature did not intend that an individual be
charged with involuntary manslaughter for causing the death of another by operation of a motor vehicle. Aggravated vehicular homicide
is an aggravated felony of the third degree. 2 ' Vehicular homicide is a
*misdemeanor of the first degree,12 8 which is punishable by not more
than six months in prison. 2 '
Involuntary manslaughter based on the commission of a misdemeanor carries a more severe penalty than vehicular homicide and an
identical penalty to aggravated vehicular homicide. Involuntary manslaughter is an aggravated felony of the third degree only if the under-

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Chippendale, 52 Ohio St. at 122, 556 N.E.2d at 1138.
Goldsmith, supra note 17, at 572 n.27, 573 n.31.
See supra note 16.
§ 2903.06(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1990).
Id. § 2903.07(B).
Id. § 2929.21(B)(1) (Baldwin 1986).
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130 Aggravated vehicular
lying act constitutes a misdemeanor offense.
homicide and misdemeanor involuntary manslaughter are third degree
aggravated felonies punishable by at least two years in prison with a
maximum sentence of ten years.' 3 '
Although a defendant can be charged with all three offenses, and
a jury could find him guilty of all three, he can be sentenced for only
one of those offenses."3 2 However, the prosecution can choose from
33
which of the allied offenses a sentence should be imposed.' Involuntary manslaughter based on the commission of a misdemeanor cur"
rently carries the same penalty as aggravated vehicular homicide.'
Therefore, imposing sentence for the involuntary manslaughter conviction is unnecessary where there is also a conviction for aggravated vehicular homicide for the same underlying conduct. Prior to the 1989
amendment to section 2903.06, involuntary manslaughter carried the
13 5
harshest penalty and was the offense often chosen by the prosection.
With the 1989 revision, the disparity in penalties was lessened, but not
fully alleviated. Moreover, imposing a sentence for involuntary manslaughter where there is a conviction for vehicular homicide would be
a
inappropriate given the inconsistent sentences for each.'
In contrast to the vehicular statutes, application of involuntary
manslaughter to conduct resulting in vehicular related deaths does not
require a showing of any mental state. The maximum sentence assessable under the vehicular homicide statutes is ten years, but only if the
operation of the motor vehicle was reckless. More realistically, the
maximum sentence would be six months because violation of a traffic
offense would probably amount to negligent conduct more often than
recklessness. However, the minimum sentence for involuntary manslaughter based on a misdemeanor is two years. Although the imprisonment terms are identical for aggravated vehicular homicide and involuntary manslaughter based on a misdemeanor, the involuntary
manslaughter charge is easier to prove. If the prosection can not prove

130. Id. § 2903.04(C). Involuntary manslaughter based on a felony is an aggravated felony
of the first degree, punishable by at least five years in prison with a maximum sentence of twentyfive years. Id. § 2929.11(B)(1)(a).
131. Id. § 2929.11(B)(3)(a).
132. Id. § 2941.25.
133. There are no traffic offenses which if violated would result in a felony. Most traffic
offenses are minor misdemeanors. § 4511.99 (Baldwin Supp. 1990); see supra note 11.
134. Both are third degree aggravated felonies carrying a minimum sentence of two years
and a- maximum of ten years. See supra note 11.
135. See supra note 11.
136. The maximum imprisonment term for vehicular homicide is six months as compared to
a minimum term of two years for involuntary manslaughter based on a misdemeanor. Compare §
2929.21(B)(1) (Baldwin 1986) with id. § 2929.11(B)(3)(a).
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aggravated vehicular homicide then the two year minimum/ten year
maximum sentence is unwarranted. It should not become warranted if
the jury is left with little alternative but to convict on involuntary manslaughter because there was a per se violation of a traffic regulation.
This conclusion is particularly appropriate where the jury acquits a defendant of vehicular homicide. If the conduct was not negligent, making the six month maximum sentence inapplicable, even the minimum
sentence of two years for involuntary manslaughter likewise should be
inapplicable.
This problem is illustrated in State v. Centers.1 3 7 Mr. Centers, by
crossing over the center line, violated section 4511.25. The statute is
classified as a minor misdemeanor and a violation of it is punishable by
a one hundred dollar fine.188 Mr. Centers could have faced a maximum
sentence of five years imprisonment for aggravated vehicular homicide
if the jury found that by crossing over the center line he acted recklessly. He could have faced a maximum sentence of six months if the
jury found that his conduct was negligent and convicted him of the
lesser included offense of vehicular homicide.18 9
However, the jury acquitted Mr. Centers of both aggravated vehicular homicide and vehicular homicide, but convicted him of involuntary manslaughter. 140 As a result, Mr. Centers was sentenced to ten
years in prison, despite the jury's finding that he had not acted recklessly or negligently. 41 This sentence was twice as long as the maximum term he would have had to serve if he had acted recklessly.
Although Mr. Centers' conduct was deemed by the jury less
blameworthy than someone acting in a reckless or negligent manner,
his sentence fails to reflect that fact. In the absence of a culpable
mental state, the penalty for causing the death of another while operating a motor vehicle should be less severe, rather than more severe.
Therefore, the ten year sentence he received does not correlate to the
jury's findings of fact. Mr. Centers would have been better off if the
jury had found that he acted recklessly.
Differing penalties for separate offenses involving general and specific statutes led the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Volpe 142 to conclude that the two statutes were irreconcilable. The court analyzed the
relationship between a specific statute prohibiting forms of gambling
and a general statute prohibiting possession of enumerated items for

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

No. 9380 (Ohio Ct. App. May 19, 1986) (LEXIS, Ohio library, App file).
§ 4511.99(E) (Baldwin Supp. 1990) (emphasis added).
Centers, No. 9380 (LEXIS, Ohio library, App file).
Id.
Id.
38 Ohio St. 3d 191, 527 N.E.2d 818 (1988).
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criminal use.14 3 The court concluded that since the statutes were irreconcilable, section 1.51 of the Ohio code provides that the specific statute should govern.""
The same conclusion is unavoidable upon analysis of the relation-

ship between the vehicular homicide statutes and the involuntary manslaughter statute. These statutes are likewise irreconcilable. Effect cannot be given to both because it would result in a disparate penalties for
one set of circumstances, which could support both a vehicular homi-

cide offense and involuntary manslaughter offense.
For instance, in State v. Torres,"" the defendant appealed his con-

viction and consecutive sentences for aggravated vehicular homicide
and involuntary manslaughter."16 Torres was sentenced three to five
years for aggravated vehicular homicide and five to ten years for involuntary manslaughter.1 4' The Lorain County Court of Appeals found

that the aggravated vehicular homicide and involuntary manslaughter
convictions, both based on the misdemeanor of driving while under the
influence, were allied offenses. 48 Each crime required proof of the
same elements. Therefore, the court held that the defendant could not
be sentenced under both statutes." 9 However, the court reversed the
conviction for aggravated vehicular homicide and affirmed150the conviction and lengthier sentence for involuntary manslaughter.
It is inequitable for an. individual to be acquitted of both aggravated and vehicular homicide and then be convicted of involuntary
manslaughter. If an individual has not acted recklessly or negligently
while operating a 'motor vehicle, then his conduct is not the type that
should result in restraint of liberty, despite the fact that another individual was killed. This type of conduct is what society is willing to label
as accidental and any resulting liability is limited to the civil context.
C. An Involuntary Manslaughter Conviction Absent Reckless or
Negligent Conduct Serves No Punitive Purpose
The main purpose underlying the criminal law process is to direct
societal conduct, mainly through prohibitions, for the benefit of the entire community.' 6 ' The aim is to protect society by punishing conduct
that is undesirable and contrary to communal responsibility as defined

143.
144.
145.
1.46.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 193, 527 N.E.2d at 820-21.
Id. at 194, 527 N.E.2d at 821.
31 Ohio App. 3d 118, 508 N.E.2d 970 (1986).
Id. at 118, 508 N.E.2d at 971.
Id. at 118-19, 508 N.E.2d at 971.
Id. at 120, 508 N.E.2d at 973.
Id.
Id. at 121, 508 N.E.2d at 973.
Hart, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoas. 401, 403 (1958).
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by the law. " ' Imposition of punishment is an attempt to encourage individuals to act in a certain manner within the societal norms. 15 3 There

are four theories of punishment: incapacitation, deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution.1 54 Each theory attempts to accomplish a different
purpose. The first three theories are based on a utilitarian justification,

that punishment serves a useful purpose.15 5 The justification for retriis deserved based on the egregiousness of
bution is that the punishment
156
the crime committed.
Incapacitation accomplishes the purpose of protecting society. Individuals who are imprisoned are those who would present a risk to
society because they have demonstrated their inability to function in
15 7
accordance with societal norms.
Deterrence is divided into two categories, special/individual and
general prevention.158 Special/individual deterrence is directed to individual criminals. If the criminal is subject to a punishment which
causes him hardship, the hope is that he will refrain from further engaging in similar criminal behavior.15 In contrast to special/individual
deterrence, general deterrence focuses on others, rather than the individual criminal. The principle is that by punishing one individual for
criminal behavior, others will refrain from engaging in similar behavior
in order to avoid the same consequences.'1 0 There is an educational
element to general deterrence which seeks to inform society of what
constitutes desirable and undesirable conduct by publicizing penalties
imposed upon those convicted of a crime.1 6 '
The purpose of rehabilitation is to provide a criminal with treatment which will enable him to return to society. Rehabilitation is employed when the cause of the abnormal conduct can be identified and
treated effectively. 62 This theory seeks to help the individual rather
than punish him. Society also benefits because the determination is
made that the individual undergoing rehabilitation can become a valua-

152. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 54, § 1.5, at 30; Hart, supra note 151, at 410; see
also E. PUTTHAMMER, ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 2-5 (recognizing the limitations of
criminal law in accomplishing its goals).
153. See id. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 54, § 1.5, at 30-31.
154. Id. § 1.5(a), at 31-36; see also Hart, supra note 151, at 409 (arguing that criminal law
should focus on ways of elevating acceptance of social responsibility rather than condemnation).
155. See P. ROBINSON, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL LAW 22 (1988).
156. See id. at 22-23.
157. W. LAFAVE & A. ScOTT, supra note 54, § 1.5(a)(2).
158. Id. §§ 1.5(a)(1), (4).
159. Id. § 1.5(a)(1).
160. Id. § 1.5(a)(4).
161. See id.§ 1.5(a)(5).
162. Id. § 1.5(a)(3).
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ble member of society and should be returned to the community."63
The final theory of punishment, retribution, is based on revenge.
Individuals who have caused a victim to suffer are likewise subjected to
suffering. 1 6' The criminal is deprived of life or liberty because his conduct was so contrary to an ordered society that a retributive punishment is imposed to demonstrate society's collective outrage.16
Retribution is the only theory of punishment which could have any.
modicum of application to conduct which is accidental and free of reckless or negligent aspects. 6 6 Yet, retribution is unwarranted against one
whose conduct resulted in unintended harm and was not so disruptive
of an ordered society to call for revenge. 6 7 Incapacitation, deterrence,
or rehabilitation, likewise would be ineffective. There is no guaranteed
method of protecting society against accidents. Therefore, incapacitating orderly members of society who have caused a traffic accident
would not decrease any risks to the safety of society. Accidents consist
of inadvertent actions; thus, individual members of society cannot alter
their behavior based on any punishment they or others might receive.
It has been urged that inadvertent negligence is not a sufficient basis
for criminal conviction, both on the utilitarian ground that threatened
sanctions cannot influence the inadvertent actor and on the moral ground
that criminal punishment should be reserved for cases involving conscious fault. The utilitarian argument is that the inadvertent actor by
definition does not perceive the risks of his conduct, and thus cannot be
deterred from risk creation. The moral argument is that the legitimacy
of criminal condemnation is premised upon personal accountability of
the sort that is usually and properly measured by an estimate of the
actor's willingness consciously to violate clearly established societal
norms. Those who hold this view argue that the actor who does not perceive the risks associated with his conduct presents a moral situation different in kind from that of the actor who knows exactly what he is doing
and what risks he is running and who nevertheless makes a conscious

163. Id.
164. Id. § 1.5(a)(6).
165. Id.; see Reflections on the Proposed Ohio Law of Homicide, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. (arguing
that retribution alone is an ineffective form of punishment for homicide offenses because any
sentence in excess of deterring undermines the penal system's goal of preventing harm).
166. The other three theories focus on correcting a conscious decision to engage in illegal
conduct.
167. Cf.E. PUTTHAMMIER. supra note 152, at 8 (arguing that retribution is insidious to the
concept of criminal justice because it does not serve to guide human conduct). In State v. Montecalvo, No. 89 CA 004653 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1990) (LEXIS, Ohio library, App file), a
paramedic responding to an emergency struck and killed a driver of another vehicle while proceeding through a red light. The paramedic was acquitted of aggravated vehicular homicide, yet convicted of involuntary manslaughter based on the minor misdemeanor of the failure of emergency
vehicles to proceed cautiously past red or stop signal.
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choice condemned by the penal law. 1 8
Generally, accidents are unforseen events with unintended results.
The Ohio legislature did not intend for individuals to be imprisoned as
the result of accidental conduct involving motor vehicles. Both aggravated vehicular homicide and vehicular homicide require a culpable
mental state. If the jury finds that the requisite mental state is lacking
then punishment should not be imposed. The result is that this conduct
should be remedied, if possible, by civil liability.
D. The Application of Involuntary ManslaughterProvides Unlimited
ProsecutorialDiscretion
In State v. Chippendale,16" the Warren County Court of Appeals
reversed the jury's verdict against the defendant for involuntary manslaughter. 17 0 The defendant was involved in a traffic accident which
proximately caused the death of a passenger in the vehicle he struck.
The court held that the special provisions of aggravated and vehicular
homicide prevail over the general provision of involuntary
manslaughter.
The appellate court also questioned the application of the involuntary manslaughter statute to traffic related deaths for two additional
reasons. The first was the prosecutorial discretion that would be employed in deciding which misdemeanors would provide a basis for the
offense.' 71 The language of the involuntary manslaughter statute authorizes prosecution based on any felony or misdemeanor, 7 2 and the
courts have allowed involuntary manslaughter charges to be based on
minor misdemeanors. 1 8 The second reason was the extent to which the
severity of the tragedy would impact a prosecutor's decision to charge a
particular individual with involuntary manslaughter.17 4 For instance,
the state might be more likely to prosecute when a child has been killed
as opposed to an adult, or when a police officer has been killed as opposed to a vagrant. The appellate court stated:
[W]ithout any established standards for deciding when to indict for in168. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4 comment 3 (1980) (footnote omitted).
169. No. 88-07-054 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 6, 1989) (LEXIS, Ohio library, App file), rev'd,
52 Ohio St. 3d 118, 556 N.E.2d 1134 (1990).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.04(A)-(B) (Baldwin 1986).
173. E.g., State v. Montecalvo, No. 89 CA004653 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1990) (LEXIS,
Ohio library, App file) (failure of emergency vehicles to proceed cautiously past red or stop signal); Centers, No. 9380 (LEXIS, Ohio Library, App file) (crossing the center line). But see
Montecalvo, No. 89 CA004653 (LEXIS, Ohio library, App file) (Cacioppo, J., dissenting) (Involuntary manslaughter should not be based on minor misdemeanors).
174. Chippendale, No. 88-07-054 (LEXIS, Ohio library, App file).
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voluntary manslaughter, the danger exists that prosecutors may engage
in selective prosecution and indict on involuntary manslaughter charges
those individuals involved in vehicular deaths where the underlying conduct or the victim is of a particularly sensitive nature or the circumthe accident make a strong emotional appeal to pubstances surrounding
5
lic opinion.

1

7

Mr. Chippendale was sentenced to serve six months in prison on
the involuntary manslaughter conviction.17 Involuntary manslaughter
based on a misdemeanor is an aggravated felony of the third degree
which carries a minimum sentence of two years imprisonment. 1 7 The
vehicular homicide offense of which defendant was also convicted is a
first degree misdemeanor carrying a maximum penalty of six months.
Though sentenced for involuntary manslaughter, his prison term was
more consistent with the penalty for vehicular homicide. On the opposite extreme, Mr. Centers, who was acquitted of both aggravated vehicular homicide and vehicular homicide, was sentenced to serve ten years
in prison for involuntary manslaughter.1 7 8 Yet, Mr. Chippendale's conduct which led to the homicide convictions was driving while under the
influence.1 7 9 Mr. Centers, however, had merely crossed over the center
line of the highway. 180 The difference in the punishments imposed upon
Mr. Centers and Mr. Chippendale may be explained by examining the
victims of each accident. In the Chippendale case, a pregnant passenger in the vehicle he struck was killed, though the child survived.1 81
However, when Mr. Centers accidentally crossed the center line, the
oncoming vehicle happened to be driven by a police officer, who died as
a result.18 2
IV.

A.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS ARISING FROM
APPLICATION OF INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER

Amend the Involuntary ManslaughterStatute

The most expeditious way of resolving the redundancy and inequities that arise from application of involuntary manslaughter to vehicular related fatalities is for the General Assembly to amend section
2903.04. The amendment should explicitly exclude traffic fatalities

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.:
Id.

182.

Centers, No. 9380 (LEXIS, Ohio library, App file).

§§ 2903.04(C), 2929.11 (B)(3)(a).
Centers, No. 9380 (LEXIS, Ohio library, App file).
Chippendale, No. 88-07-054 (LEXIS, Ohio library, App file).
Centers, No. 9380 (LEXIS, Ohio library, App file).
Chippendale, No. 88-07-054 (LEXIS, Ohio library, App file).
OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
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from the statutory crime of involuntary manslaughter. 83 The General
Assembly implicitly provided such an exclusion by enacting sections
2903.06 and 2903.07. However, in the absence of explicit language the
courts' range of interpretation is widened and the results have magni8"
fied the inherent inequities caused by the overlap.

For example, Michigan's classification of crimes also contains an

overlap between a manslaughter statute 85 and a negligent homicide
statute, that only applies to the operation of a vehicle.1 86 However, despite the overlap these statutes do not contain the problems associated

with Ohio's statutory scheme. Both statutes can be applied in a manner
that gives effect to each.

The statutory manslaughter crime is not defined, but according to
the common law, it encompasses both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. 8 ' Common law involuntary manslaughter consists of grossly
negligent conduct.1 88 Therefore an individual who kills another while
driving in a grossly negligent manner is guilty of manslaughter. Negligent homicide consists of careless, reckless, or negligent operation of a

motor vehicle that results in the death of another. 189 Each of these statutes is based on the culpable mental state of the individual charged

with the offense. Negligent homicide is a lesser included offense of
manslaughter.1 90 The prosecution could submit both offenses to the

183. For a discussion of the Technical Committee's proposed manslaughter statute that
contained such exclusionary language, although fundamentally different than the involuntary
manslaughter statute enacted by the General Assembly, see supra notes 64-69 and accompanying
text. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.21 (West Supp. 1990) (criminal vehicular homicide covers deaths "not constituting murder or manslaughter").
184. E.g., State v. Chippendale, 52 Ohio St. 3d 118, 556 N.E.2d 1134 (1990); State v.
Centers, No. 9380 (Ohio Ct. App. May 19, 1986) (LEXIS, Ohio library, App file); State v. Davis,
13 Ohio App. 3d 265, 469 N.E.2d 83 (1983).
185. MIcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 750.321 (West 1968).
186. Id. § 750.324.
187. People v. Richardson, 409 Mich. 126, 293 N.W.2d 332 (1980). "Our manslaughter
statute does not define that offense, but instead incorporates the common-law definition. There are
two categories of manslaughter at common law: voluntary and involuntary." Id. at 134 n.8, 293
N.W.2d at 335 n.8 (citations omitted).
188. People v. Rettelle, 173 Mich. App 196, 199, 433 N.W.2d 401, 403 (1988) ("Involuntary manslaughter occurs when death results from negligence which is gross, wanton or wilful
.... ");People v. Sealy, 136 Mich. App. 168, 172, 356 N.W.2d 614, 616 (1984). ("To convict of
involuntary manslaughter, a defendant must have been grossly negligent.").
189. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.324 (West 1968). The statute provides:
Any person who, by the operation of any vehicle upon any highway or upon any other
property, public or private, at an immoderate rate of speed or in a careless, reckless or
negligent manner, but not wilfully or wantonly, shall cause the death of another, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor . . ..
Id.
190. Id. § 750.325; People v. McIntosh, 400 Mich. 1, 252 N.W.2d 779 (1977). The Michigan Supreme Court stated:
Manslaughter committed with a motor vehicle is not separately defined as a crime by
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jury, and if they were unable to find the defendant's conduct grossly
negligent, they might find that the defendant's conduct met a lesser
standard of careless, reckless or negligent conduct. 91 Although both
reckless and negligent conduct form the basis of the lesser included
offense of negligent homicide, Michigan's manslaughter and negligent
homicide statutes govern conduct similar to Ohio's aggravated vehicular homicide and vehicular homicide statutes. The legislative intent is
the same; two distinct standards must be met for two distinct crimes
In Michigan, manslaughter is a felony,
with two distinct penalties.'
punishable by a maximum of fifteen years imprisonment. 9 3 Negligent
homicide is a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum of two years
imprisonment. 9" The two Michigan statutes both govern deaths caused
by the operation of a motor vehicle and, yet, work in conjunction with
one another. There are no inconsistencies. Negligent homicide requires
a lower standard than the greater offense of manslaughter, and thus,
results in a lesser penalty. Neither statute has as its basis simply the
violation of a traffic regulation.
Ohio's aggravated vehicular homicide and vehicular homicide statutes likewise work in conjunction with one another. It is only when
involuntary manslaughter is also included that inconsistencies and inequities arise.

the common law or by statute. There is only the general crime of manslaughter which may,
of course, be committed with a motor vehicle.
We believe the better view is that manslaughter committed with a motor vehicle does
not have to be formally pled in an information charging murder in order for the jury to
consider negligent homicide as a possible lesser offense. Prospectively from the date of this
decision, if the jurors are or should be permitted to consider manslaughter committed with
a motor vehicle, then pursuant to MCLA 750.325; MSA 28.557, they also should be permitted to consider negligent homicide. This view preserves the legislative link between the
two crimes, does not conflict with practical considerations and promotes, rather than hinders, the purpose for which the statute was enacted.
Id. at 5, 7 (citations omitted).
191.

MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.325 provides:

The crime of negligent homicide shall be deemed to be included within every crime of
manslaughter charged to have been committed in the operation of any vehicle, and in any
case where a defendant is charged with manslaughter committed in the operation of any
vehicle, if the jury shall find the defendant not guilty of the crime of manslaughter, it may
render a verdict of guilty of negligent homicide.
192. The standard for manslaughter by operation of a vehicle is gross negligence. Sealy,
136 Mich. App. at 172. The standards for negligent homicide are carelessness, recklessness or
negligence. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.324.
193.

MIcH. CoMP. LAws ANN.

194.

Id. § 750.324.

§

750.321.
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B. Repeal and Replace the Vehicular Related Statutes and Involuntary ManslaughterStatute
The more effective way of dealing with the overlap would be to

reclassify the criminal offenses in chapter 2903 into a criminal homicide statute. To accomplish this, it would be necessary to repeal the
involuntary manslaughter, aggravated vehicular homicide, vehicular

homicide statutes, along with the remaining statutes currently in that
chapter.
Prior to 1974, Ohio's involuntary manslaughter offense was based
on the commission of an unlawful act. 195 The state judiciary struggled
with the parameters of "unlawful act." 1 8 The involuntary manslaughter statute was revised, consistent with its current language when the
Ohio General Assembly recodified Ohio's criminal code. 9" The legislature clarified the ambiguity by deleting "unlawful act" and basing the

offense on either the commission of a felony or misdemeanor.
There is a modern trend of displacing the "unlawful act" element

of involuntary manslaughter with criminal negligence. 9 8 In Ohio, "unlawful act" was not displaced by "criminal negligence," but replaced
with the commission of either a felony or misdemeanor. 99 However,
the element of negligence is used in two places in chapter 2903, which
governs homicide and assault. This chapter, which contains the involuntary manslaughter statute and vehicular and aggravated vehicular
homicide statutes, also contains a negligent homicide statute. 0 0 Furthermore, criminal negligence is one of the necessary mental states for

195. See supra notes 23-34 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., State v. O'Mara, 105 Ohio St. 94, 136 N.E. 885 (1922) (violation of city
ordinance may be an unlawful act within definition of manslaughter); Black v. State, 103 Ohio St.
434, 133 N.E. 195 (1921) (shooting at a target within city limits is not an unlawful act within
definition of manslaughter even if it results in a death).
197. Compare OHIO LEGIS. SERv. COMM'N, supra note 9, § 2903.03, at 73 with § 2903.04
(Baldwin 1986).
198. For a listing of the states which currently base involuntary manslaughter on "unlawful
act," see infra note 206.
199. This does not represent a very significant change because the commission of either a
felony or misdemeanor is unlawful. The manslaughter statute proposed by The Technical Committee did displace the "unlawful act" basis of the crime with the culpable mental states of knowingly and recklessly. OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM'N, supra note 9, at 73. In addition, a third division
of the manslaughter statute was based on the commission of an offense of violence, thus proof of
the requisite mental state of the offense committed would have been necessary for a conviction. Id.
For the text of the Technical Committee's proposed manslaughter statute, see text accompanying
note 64.
200. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.05 (Baldwin 1986). The statute provides that "[n]o
person shall negligently cause the death of another by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous
ordinance as defined in section 2923.11 of the Revised Code." Id. The definition of dangerous
ordinance generally relates to certain firearms and explosives. Id. § 2923.11(K) (Baldwin Supp.
1990).
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deaths resulting from the operation of motor vehicles. 0 1
The Model Penal Code, drafted in 1962, suggests a criminal homicide. statute which can form the basis for murder, manslaughter, or
negligent homicide. 202 A conviction for criminal homicide results from
either purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently causing someone's death.203 If the defendant purposely or knowingly causes one's
death, he. is charged with murder; reckless homicide gives rise to manslaughter, and negligently causing someone's death is negligent homicide.2 0 ' There is no provision for an involuntary manslaughter offense
based on the commission of a misdemeanor. Each criminal classification of criminal homicide-murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide-requires a culpable mental state, the least of which is negligence.
Section 2.02(2)(d) of the Model Penal Code specifies a higher standard
of negligence than that of the reasonable person standard. Negligent
homicide involves an awareness "of a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the material element exists or will result from his conduct."20
Ohio is one of at least ten states which retains an involuntary
manslaughter offense based on an unlawful act; commission of a felony
or misdemeanor. 06 This statute essentially results in strict criminal
liability.
It dispenses with proof of culpability and imposes liability for a serious
crime without reference to the actor's state of mind. This result is not
only morally unjustified, but it also operates quite inequitably among individuals. Application of the rule in the context of traffic offense illustrates the point. Speed limits are in part set to prevent accidents dangerous to life. Occasionally, speeding causes the death of another in
circumstances in which the actor was unaware of the risk of death and
indeed cannot be judged negligent with respect thereto. Subjecting such
a driver, who is engaged in behavior so like many others, to a severe
prison term introduces an unfair haphazardness to criminal punish-

201.

Id. § 2903.07(A).

MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1(2) (1980).
203. Id. § 210.1(1).
204. Id. § 210.2(I)(a) (murder); id. § 210.3(l)(a) (manslaughter); id.§ 210.4(l) (negligent
homicide).
205. Id. § 2.02(2)(d) ("a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person
would observe").
206. The other nine states include: GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-3 (1988) ("unlawful act"); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-4 (West 1986) (commission of a felony or misdemeanor); IowA CODE ANN.
§ 707.5 (West 1979) (commission of "public offense" or "act"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3404
(1988) ("unlawful act" or lawful act in "unlawful manner"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:31 (West
1986) (engaged in perpetuation of felony or intentional misdemeanor); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
609.20 (West Supp. 1990) (commission of misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28.305 (1989) ("unlawful act"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-3 (B) (1984) ("unlawful act); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 219 § 711 (West 1983).

202.
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ment ....
[T]he Model Code rejects any form of strict liability in the
07
law of homicide.1
Even though the Ohio General Assembly has not yet rejected strict
liability for the statutory crime of involuntary manslaughter, traffic related offenses should not form the basis for the underlying misdemeanor. Traffic related fatalities involving either negligent or reckless
operation of a motor vehicle are classified as vehicular or aggravated
vehicular homicides.
Kentucky's applicable statutes, which are classified into three
crimes, provide another example. The greater offense is manslaughter
in the first degree, which requires a showing of intent. 0 8 It is a class B
felony, punishable by ten to twenty years imprisonment. 0 9 Next in degree of severity is manslaughter in the second degree, which consists of
wantonly causing the death of another.21 0 It is a class C felony punishable by five to ten years in prison.211 The third offense is reckless homicide which arises when one recklessly causes the death of another. 2 .
Reckless homicide is a class D felony punishable by one to five years in
prison. 1 The culpable mental state for each of these crimes varies,
with reckless conduct constituting the least of the offenses, as supported
by its corresponding penalty. These three statutes work together consistently and do not result in the tragedies caused by the Ohio statutory
scheme.
If Mr. Centers had been charged under either the Michigan or
Kentucky statutes and the jury likewise acquitted him because of the
lack of the requisite mental state, he would not be serving a prison
term. The Ohio involuntary manslaughter statute essentially results in
strict criminal liability in many traffic related homicides. A conviction
depends only on violation of a statute, either a felony or misdemeanor,
as the proximate cause of another's death. " ' By enacting the aggravated vehicular homicide and vehicular homicide statutes the Ohio leg-

207.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 comment 7 (1980).
208. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.030 (Baldwin 1984).
209. Id. § 532.060(1)(b).
210. Id. § 507.040.
211. Id. § 532.060(1)(c).
212. Id. § 507.050.
213. Id. § 532.060(1)(d).
214. There are situations where mere violation of a statutory misdemeanor would not result
in a conviction of involuntary manslaughter. See, e.g., State v. Jodrey, No. 840406 (Ohio Ct. App.
Apr. 10, 1985) (LEXIS, Ohio library, App file) (driving under suspension in violation of section
4507.16, a misdemeanor, was not the proximate cause of victim of traffic accident's death). The
Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that a statutory violation must be the proximate cause of a
fatality to support an involuntary manslaughter conviction. Jackson v. State, 101 Ohio St. 152,
127 N.E.2d 870 (1920).
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islature intended a conviction to be based on a culpable mental state
rather than what, in some cases, has amounted to strict criminal
liability.
C.

Restructure the Penalties for Involuntary Manslaughter

If involuntary manslaughter continues to be used in connection
with vehicular related fatalities a separate penalty should be drafted.
This penalty should be structured so that it is lesser in severity than the
penalty for vehicular homicide. 5 Therefore, if an individual charged
with all three crimes is acquitted of aggravated vehicular and vehicular
homicide but convicted of involuntary manslaughter, the sanction will
more accurately correspond to the jury's verdict. Furthermore, it would
reflect the notion that an individual convicted of involuntary manslaughter which does not require a finding of a specific mental state is
not more blameworthy than individuals convicted of reckless or negligent operation of a motor vehicle.
D. Narrowly Construe Involuntary Manslaughter in the Absence of
Amendment
Involuntary manslaughter should be narrowly construed if applied
in connection with deaths resulting from the operation of motor vehicles. This conclusion is supported by two propositions. First, involuntary manslaughter and the vehicular homicide statutes are redundant,
yet can result in disparate and inequitable penalties.21 6 Second, according to the rules of statutory construction the specific statute should govern over the general statute. 1 Therefore, aggravated vehicular homicide and vehicular homicide should govern over involuntary
manslaughter.
In criminal cases involving traffic fatalities, judges should not apply involuntary manslaughter. At the very least, if courts do impose
sentences under involuntary manslaughter for traffic fatalities, they
should narrowly construe the penalty provisions. In State v. Chippen-

215. Vehicular homicide is a misdemeanor of the first degree punishable by imprisonment
up to six months and a fine which can not exceed $ 1,000. OHIo REV. CODE. ANN. §
2929.21(B)(1), (C)(1) (Baldwin Supp. 1990). For example, Indiana's involuntary manslaughter
statute is premised on killing someone as a result of committing a felony or misdemeanor. However, the statute specifies that "if the killing results from the operation of a vehicle, the offense is a
Class D felony." IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-4 (West 1986). A Class D felony carries a lesser
penalty than a Class C penalty which applies to all other forms of involuntary manslaughter.
Compare id. § 35-50-2-6 (West Supp. 1990) with id. § 35-50-2-7 (West Supp. 1990). Reference
to the Indiana statute is provided solely for its consistent penalty provision.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 127-137.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 100-126.
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dale218 and State v. Davis2' the courts placed emphasis on what both
thought was the language of the proposed manslaughter statute which
explicitly excluded traffic fatalities from the involuntary manslaughter
offense. 220 Despite the court's incorrect account of the legislative history, the opposite implication, that involuntary manslaughter should be
applied to vehicular related deaths, is not supported by the inconsistencies that result or the fact that there is no reason to have the separate
vehicular homicide offenses.
V.

CONCLUSION

Homicides caused by operation of a motor vehicle should not be
prosecuted under the involuntary manslaughter statute. Prosecution
under involuntary manslaughter displaces both the aggravated vehicular homicide and vehicular homicide statutes. These statutes were enacted in 1974 and have not been repealed by the Ohio legislature. By
applying involuntary manslaughter to the operation of a motor vehicle
which resulted in the death of another, the courts are, in effect, nullifying the vehicular related homicide statutes. Furthermore, involuntary
manslaughter operates in this context essentially as a strict criminal
liability statute, and the Ohio legislature intended that convictions for
motor vehicle homicides be based on either reckless or negligent conduct. However, this conclusion finds its greatest support in the overwhelming unfairness which results from the disparate penalties associated with these offenses. The legislature did not intend for someone
who was not acting recklessly or negligently to spend ten years in
prison because another person was killed in a motor vehicle accident.
Thus, the other tragedy is the deprivation of liberty for those persons
who have been sentenced under the involuntary manslaughter statute.
Deborah A. Millum

218. 52 Ohio St. 3d 118, 56 N.E.2d 1134 (1990).
219. 13 Ohio App. 3d 265, 469 N.E.2d 83 (1983).
220. Chippendale, 52 Ohio St. 3d at 122, 556 N.E.2d at 1138; Davis, 13 Ohio App. 3d at
269, 469 N.E.2d at 88.
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